If you are passionate about negotiation, it’s only natural to be intrigued when two negotiation experts discuss one of the biggest threats of our time — the war in Ukraine.
What learnings do the experts share with you? Such was my attitude when I read Jack Nashers conversation with Bob Mnookin about negotiating in The Ukraine War.
This January Forbes Magazine published an article by Jack Nasher titled: ‘Bargaining With The Devil? A Conversation With Bob Mnookin About Negotiating In The Ukraine War’. The topic discussed with Bob Mnookin, a well-known negotiation expert is: Can the Russian-Ukrainian war be resolved through negotiation?
Nasher posts 3 questions:
‘Will the Russian/Ukrainian conflict be settled through negotiation?’
‘(Or) will it be the spark that ignites World War III?’
‘If there is to be a negotiated settlement, what might the terms look like?’
As Jim Camp clearly explains in his book ‘ Start with No ‘, negotiators don’t control the outcome; they merely control their own actions. The question shouldn’t be what is the outcome? The question is how do you get to an outcome? What is the process a negotiator is to follow? What are the dos and don’ts?
As an introduction and inviting a reaction to the first question Nasher states: ‘When you read and watch the media right now you see the typical traps you point out in your work, traps that make negotiations so difficult: demonization of the enemy, moralism and self-righteousness.. and that eventually leads to a call for battle..’.
Mnookin interestingly replies by referring to two well-known examples namely Mr Nelson Mandela and Mr Winston Churchill. Both men were great negotiators – but for very different reasons. Mandela negotiated with the South African government. Churchill refused to negotiate with the Nazis – until these were defeated and then were to surrender unconditionally.
The examples of Churchill and Mandela are fit to show that the decision to negotiate ultimately is a matter of personal judgement. For both men, the stakes were very high. The stakes were so high because both were intimately connected with the people they represented. They knew the stakes for the men and women in their country and for whose interests they were willing to bring personal sacrifices. Churchill had no trust in the other party, and Mandela saw an opportunity to create trust.
Ukraine is no different, the Ukrainian leaders are to determine if and when to negotiate, it is about the lives and future of their people after all.
Mnookin justifiably believes that it is wrong to force Ukraine to negotiate and that negotiation is not “free”, it involves cost and consequences.
That message can be the opposite of what you want to achieve, in that case, it is better not to negotiate.
Churchill did not trust that the Nazis would keep their word. Nasher comments, however, that Putin is keeping his word: he always said that the expansion of NATO would result in conflict. So, Putin is not lying nor a maniac, according to Nasher. He ends the statement with a cautionary question: do you think Putin can be trusted?
Mnookin responds by saying that not everything Putin says is a lie, but that is not the same as being trustworthy. He didn’t respect the sovereignty of Ukraine, not in 2014 and not in 2022. So yes, sometimes he does what he says, but he also is willing to violate agreements. The biggest challenge Mnookin sees, and rightfully so, is how Ukraine can be assured of the promises Russia makes if the negotiation would be successful.
This is also the big difference between our daily negotiations and this negotiation. If you and I make an agreement we can go to court if any of us violate the agreement. The outcome is assured by a court. That is not the case in a Russia and Ukraine negotiation, where nobody has the power to enforce a judgement.
Some people can be, some people can’t and some people will decide per situation. That’s why you often sign a contract so there is legal enforceability. Recent history shows that Putin has no respect for Europe. He seems to have that however for the US and for China. This puts the negotiation question in a broader and more realistic perspective.
Nasher’s last question: ‘What might a resolution in Ukraine look like?’ triggered me to write this article. The question fundamentally misses the point. How is a negotiation expert, not the lead negotiator or impacted person, supposed to answer this question? Shouldn’t we all agree that to negotiate you require information and that you can’t fill in the interests of other people without having them share that information with you?
What then is the key question on negotiation that Nasher and Mnookin should have discussed?
Which factors or conditions determine the willingness to negotiate in a conflict like this?
Followed by:
What are the possible negotiation processes that can be used, once the willingness to negotiate exists?
I am afraid that the case of Ukraine’s leader Mr Zelensky is very much comparable to that of Mr Churchill almost a century ago.
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